Introduction
In October 2016, a fourteen-year-old English girl with terminal cancer won the legal right to have her remains cryogenically frozen and stored indefinitely in an American clinic following her death. 
I. Facts and Outcome
The teenager (known only in proceedings as 'JS') had been diagnosed with a rare form of cancer in 2015. When active treatment came to an end in August 2016, she began researching cryonics on the internet, in the hope that her body could be frozen on death and reanimated sometime in the future, if a cure became available. 3 The girl's parents were divorced and on very bad terms with each other; JS lived with her mother, had not had any face-to-face contact with her father since 2008, and was refusing to see him or
give him detailed knowledge of her medical condition. Both parents were legally entitled to decide the posthumous fate of their daughter's remains, but were not in agreement.
The mother supported her daughter's wish to be cryogenically preserved, and stored  School of Law, Queen's University Belfast and author of The Law and the Dead (Routledge, 2016). Thanks to the anonymous referee for their comments on the original submission. 1 Re JS (Disposal of Body) [2016] EWHC 2859 (Fam). The judgment had three parts: the first, determining the application and subject to an initial reporting restriction (to avoid any upset to the girl and her family), was handed down orally on 6 October; the second, containing further legal analysis, on 19 October; and the third, dealing with subsequent events, on 6 November. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/cryogenically-frozen-teenagerterminally-ill-cancer-a7424036.html> (accessed February 2017). 3 The scientific and ethical aspects of the process are noted in Pt II. indefinitely in a specialist facility in Michigan; 4 the father initially objected (saying he did not want his daughter to 'wake up' in 200 years' time, alone in the United States) but eventually changed his mind-though on condition that he and members of his family could view JS's body after death. However, JS refused, triggering the current application and forcing the court to resolve the parental dispute over what should happen to their daughter's remains.
Peter Jackson J acknowledged that this was a novel application, set against a tragic backdrop of childhood illness and family conflict. Yet "natural sympathy [did] not alter the need for the application to be decided in accordance with established principle, or with principle correctly established".
5
As regards the financial and logistical issues, the judge noted that the high costs of freezing the body in perpetuity (some £37,000 for a 'basic' package, around ten times the cost of an average funeral in the UK) 6 were being met by the girl's maternal grandparents, and that the hospital trust where JS was receiving palliative care was willing to grant a specialist, stand-by cryonics team access to prepare the body within minutes or hours of death. In deciding the dispute between the parents, the judge stated that he "fully under[stood] the father's misgivings" 11 around cryopreservation. However, the father's role in his daughter's life had been "extremely limited in recent years", while his request to see JS after her death would "only cause her distress in life".
12
On these facts, the mother should be allowed to make arrangements for her daughter's body to be preserved. Peter Jackson J granted a specific issue order under s 8 of the 4 The technology is not widely available. Currently, there are only two commercial facilities in America (the Cryonics Institute in Michigan, and the Alcor Life Institute in Arizona), and one in Russia (the KrioRus facility, on the outskirts of Moscow). 5 [2016] EWHC 2859 (Fam) at [23] . 6 During the various hearings, the girl's father had sought repeated assurances that he would not be liable for the costs of the cryonics process. 7 Cryonics UK is a voluntary, non-profit organisation of cryonics enthusiasts, which helps those who want this particular option by preparing the body and shipping it (in a preserved state) to a chosen cryonics facilityhttp://www.cryonics-uk.org/ (accessed February 2017). The website describes cryonic preservation as a "sort of 'ambulance to the future'". 8 The 2004 Act has an extensive remit; as well as covering the storage and use of human tissue from living donors, it regulates the removal, storage and use of "relevant material" (defined in s 53) from the dead-including human organs for transplant. However, cryonic preservation is clearly not contemplated under the 2004 Act. 9 The science itself is suspect (cryobiologist Dr Arthur Rowe likened it to "believing you can turn a hamburger back into a cow"), 17 and the process raises all sorts of ethical issues around both the treatment of the dead 18 and highly questionable claims that future revival is possible.
19
Cryonics is not a lawful method of corpse disposal in some European countries.
20
In Re JS, this particular question was something of a moot point, given the absence of commercial cryonics facilities in the UK; the court's initial task was to determine whether the teenager's body could have essential procedures performed on it before being transported to Michigan (given the optimal timeframe for the initial freezing process). Peter Jackson J noted that preparing the body within a very short time of death and granting the voluntary cryonics team access to the hospital and use of its facilities raised "serious legal and ethical issues for the hospital trust, which has to act within the law and has duties to its other patients and to its staff".
21
Conscious of the dying girl's wishes, this particular hospital was prepared to co-operate and, in doing so, to ease her distress; however, the judge emphasised that 13 Which deals with parental responsibility for a child, defined as a person under the age of 18. Such an order was possible because JS was still alive when it was made-the judge making the point that s 8 does not extend to regulating events after a child's death (ibid at The whole body can be frozen, or just the person's head (the intent being to reconstruct the individual from their brain). While legal death may have occurred, those who opt for cryonics believe that physical death has not occurred and that the body is simply being placed in a state of long-term suspension until revived and brought back to life. 17 Quoted in "Frozen Future", National Review, 9 July 2002. 18 In the present case, concerns were expressed about the procedures performed on the teenager's body after death, and the manner in which these were carried out by the cryonics team. These are discussed below. a different hospital or medical facility might not be so accommodating, and that this decision did "not set a precedent for other cases".
22
And the ruling on cryonics was equally restrictive:
I cannot emphasise enough what this case is not about. It is not about whether cryonic preservation has any scientific basis or whether it is right or wrong. The court is not approving or encouraging cryonics, still less ordering that JS's body should be cryonically preserved. 23 The judge's misgivings are clear, and are brought into sharper focus at the end of his judgment when drawing attention to events which occurred on the day of JS's death.
Cryonic preservation was completed, despite the voluntary team being "under-equipped and disorganised", and the way in which the process was handled causing "real concern to the [hospital's] medical and mortuary staff". 24 Meanwhile, the mother's preoccupation with the post-mortem arrangements was "at the expense of being fully available to JS" 25 on her daughter's last day-a somewhat paradoxical outcome, given that the father's initial objections were based on the thought of his daughter 'waking up' alone and frightened in another country, years from now, yet JS's demise might also have been lonelier and more frightening than it would have been if her mother had been there to comfort and support JS fully throughout. Of course, these events could not have been anticipated; but they reinforce the sense of not setting a precedent here and treating future applications with caution.
Looking beyond the facts of this particular case, cryonics would raise all sorts of legal issues if commercial facilities were ever opened in the UK-not to mention the legal quagmire that would have to be negotiated if reanimation ever traversed the realms of science fiction to become a practical reality. urgent task-despite all the publicity surrounding this particular case. In the meantime there are more pressing issues around corpse disposal. While cremation and burial still dominate, other methods are being developed: resomation (a liquefaction process which uses alkaline hydrolysis to dissolve the body's organic matter) and promession (here, liquid nitrogen super-cools the body before the brittle remains are shattered using ultrasonic vibration).
29
Shaped by environmental concerns, these alternatives to burial and cremation are more likely to be commercially viable in the shorter term, 30 and will require discrete regulatory frameworks.
III. Funeral Instructions-Personal Preference, Not Presumptive Right
One of the key aspects of Re JS was the girl's alleged right to choose what happened to her body when she died. Cryonic preservation is undoubtedly an esoteric request; yet many people have specific views on their post-mortem fate-for example, whether they should be buried or cremated, the type of funeral ceremony, and where they want their remains or post-cremation ashes to be placed. Personal preference is a factor here, as are specific religious and cultural beliefs. However, as the law currently stands throughout the UK, an individual has no legal right to determine their own funeral arrangements.
This particular anomaly stems from the nineteenth century case of Williams v Williams 31 which decided that, since a dead body does not constitute property, it cannot be bequeathed by will.
32
Instead, decision-making powers fall on the executor where the deceased made a will; 33 for intestate deaths, the highest ranked next-of-kin for estate administration purposes has the final say, defined 34 as the deceased's surviving spouse or civil partner, followed by children, then parents and siblings in descending order. 35 Peter Jackson J in Re JS highlighted the common law rule in Williams, and reiterated the fact that "in English law, there is no right to dictate the treatment of one's body after death" and that this is the position "regardless of testamentary capacity or religion".
36
While JS's wishes were "relevant, perhaps highly so" they were "not determinative". was to resolve the parental disagreement by deciding who was entitled to make the funeral arrangements, and preference was given to the mother here.
So, the fact that JS's funeral instructions were not legally binding had nothing to do with her being a minor: the position would have been the same if she had been an adult (though the dispute would probably not have ended up in court, because JS would have been able to make a will, appointing her mother as executor on the basis that the mother would comply with her wishes).
39
The impact of the deceased's own funeral preferences has been raised in a number of recent English cases, with some courts viewing them as an important reference point when resolving family disputes of this nature-even if not legally binding. Families clashing over a dead relative's funeral arrangements occurs more often than we might think, and English courts have encountered these disputes on numerous occasions. 2)) favours the person who was "closest" to the deceased in life-a factor which Peter Jackson J was undoubtedly influenced by in Re JS. 58 Or under its inherent jurisdiction-see n 52. 59 [2009] NZHC 2054. 60 Who were still together; the mother had been released on parole by the time of the hearing. on the basis that it would be premature: circumstances could change (the parents and paternal grandmother might reconcile), and predetermining the child's funeral arrangements would not be appropriate. 61 Peter Jackson J noted this decision in Re JS, but reached a different conclusion. There was no time for revisiting the issue after death here (cryonics requires immediate action), and the issues facing the court were both pressing and real:
There is ample authority for the proposition that the court should not stray into deciding hypothetical questions....That is not the position here: this is an actual problem that needs to be resolved now, albeit the resolution will play out at a future date.
62
The arguments for and against making a prospective order were listed earlier in the judgment: all parties were now represented before the court, resolving the issue should "prevent undignified scenes later" 63 and clarity would help third parties know how they should act; but a later change of circumstances would undermine the decision and "as a matter of public policy [courts] may not wish to encourage similar applications".
64
In rejecting the opposing claims, the judge emphasised that things were unlikely to change before JS died (the family breakdown was "very deep and long-standing") and that courts "could not decline to deal with a situation that demands resolution" because of public policy concerns. 65 So, where death is imminent 66 and families are already fighting over the arrangements and reconciliation (or compromise) is unlikely, a prospective ruling may be possible. 67 The number of situations in which this actually occurs is likely to be small-and it is worth pointing out that the girl's own wishes were also an important part of the factual matrix in Re JS, even if they were not legally binding. At a basic human level, it seems distasteful for families to be disputing the fate of someone who is not yet dead, and most legal systems would not want to encourage this, though Peter Jackson J stressed that if predeath applications "were wrongly bought, they could be dealt with accordingly".
68

Conclusion
As far as the cryonics issue was concerned, Re JS was a paradigmatic case: the teenager had made her wish to be preserved in perpetuity clear; the funds were available; her mother was prepared to carry out JS's wishes; and the hospital was willing to facilitate access for the stand-by cryonics team. However, the ruling must be looked at in this particular context, and does not set a clear precedent for similar disputes, should they arise. The logistical and practical issues would probably be similar, but the court's proverbial hands would be tied if another hospital trust or medical facility was unwilling to co-operate or surviving relatives refused to honour the dying person's request (or simply could not afford the costs of the procedure).
69
Beyond cryonics, the decision in Re JS raises more substantive legal issues around the fate of human remains. Family funeral disputes will continue to be a sad yet fertile source of litigation, and where separated parents are fighting over the remains of a dead child, courts will still have to search for specific ways of ending the impasse and favouring one parent over another-something which is much more difficult where both had close and enduring emotional relationships with their child, unlike the unfortunate situation in the present case. The question of prospective rulings may arise again, given the court's willingness to issue one in Re JS; and while fully merited on the facts, it will be interesting to see how future cases are determined and how any unwarranted applications are dispensed with. Finally, there is the issue of whether an individual's funeral instructions should be legally binding, something which was also brought into sharp focus in the present case and will continue to be a source of debate. If the Law Commission decides to look at this area in the future, the deceased's own preferences could become the primary reference point in funeral disputes. Courts would give effect to them by granting custody of the corpse or post-cremation ashes to the relative or individual who was intent on doing what the deceased wanted. 69 Assuming there were insufficient funds in the deceased's estate to cover these costs.
